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Introduction
The Relationship of Unregulated OTC Derivatives to the Meltdown. It is now accepted
wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized, and almost wholly unregulated overthe-counter (―OTC‖) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable
worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.1 Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial
products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing
market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized or non-capitalized OTC
derivative guarantees of the subprime housing investments. Moreover, the many undercapitalized
insurers of that collapsing market had other multi-trillion dollar OTC derivatives obligations with
thousands of financial counterparties (through unregulated interest rate, currency, foreign
exchange, and energy derivatives). If a financial institution failed because it could not pay off
some of these obligations, trillions of dollars of interconnected transactions would have also
failed, causing a cascade of collapsing banks throughout the world. It was this potential of
systemic failure that required the United States taxpayer to plug the huge capital hole that a daisy
chain of nonpayments by the world‘s largest financial institutions would have caused, thereby
heading off the cratering of the world‘s economy.2
An Example of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivative ―Bets‖ That Had to Be Paid by the
U.S. Taxpayer. The then perfectly lawful ―bets‖ that hedge fund manager John Paulson placed
through this unregulated OTC derivatives market provide but a single example of how that
market collectively misfired and – but for taxpayer bailouts – nearly imploded the world
economy.3 From 2006 to 2007, Mr. Paulson with, inter alia, the assistance of swaps dealers,
1

See Ben Moshinsky, Stiglitz says Banks Should Be Banned From CDS Trading, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a65VXsI.90hs; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Looters in
Loafers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk. See generally Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues
to Watch on Financial Reform — We Need an Independent Consumer Watchdog and Strong Derivatives Regulation.
Industry Lobbyists are Trying to Water Them Down, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704133804575197852294753766.html; Henry T. C. Hu, ―Empty
Creditors and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2009, at A13; MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE
DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) [hereinafter THE BIG SHORT]; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011) [hereinafter 13 BANKERS]; MICHAEL
HIRSH, CAPITAL OFFENSE: HOW WASHINGTON‘S WISE MEN TURNED AMERICA‘S FUTURE OVER TO WALL STREET
(2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL OFFENSE]; BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010) [hereinafter ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE]; INSIDE JOB (Sony
Pictures Classics & Representational Pictures 2010); Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20,
2009) [hereinafter The Warning]; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES xxiv (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.fcic.gov/report [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
2
See Moshinsky, supra note 1; Krugman, supra note 1; Blinder, supra note 1; Hu, supra note 1; THE BIG SHORT,
supra note 1.
3
Complaint at 2, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 2010 U.S.
Dist. Ct. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (―Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a
large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (‗Paulson‘), with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the
ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the
selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into
credit default swaps (‗CDS‘) with [Goldman] to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital
structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to
experience credit events in the near future.‖) (On July 15, 2010, Goldman Sachs entered into a settlement without
admitting or denying the SEC‘s allegations for the amount of $550 million.)
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purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (―CDOs‖), which were nothing more than the
purchase of insurance on his selection of weak tranches of subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities that Mr. Paulson himself did not own.4 In other words, through so-called ―naked credit
default swaps (‗CDS‘),‖ Mr. Paulson effectively bought insurance on his own selection of
subprime investments in which he had no ownership and for which he had no risk, but which he
believed would fail. Since the dawn of the 19th century, it has not been legal to buy insurance on
someone else‘s risk. However, because these ―bets‖ were categorized as OTC derivatives, they
were expressly deregulated as ―swaps‖ by Congressional enactment, and insurance laws were not
applied.
When subprime mortgage borrowers (i.e., those with various degrees of noncreditworthiness) defaulted and could not, as common sense would have suggested, sustain their
mortgages, the tranches that Mr. Paulson insured (but did not own) failed, thereby triggering
highly lucrative payment obligations to Mr. Paulson pursuant to his synthetic CDOs and naked
CDS. Paulson ultimately made about $15 billion on these bets.5
Even though the purchasers of synthetic CDOs, such as Mr. Paulson, ―profited
spectacularly from the housing crisis . . . they were not purchasing insurance against anything
they owned. Instead, they merely made side bets on the risks undertaken by others.‖6 In fact,
because synthetic CDOs mimicked insurance, those who were ―insured‖ through synthetic CDOs
were only required to sustain their multi- trillion dollar bets with insurance-like ―premiums,‖
i.e., they were only required to pay about two percent of the total amount insured.7
Moreover, as has been widely demonstrated, investors ―creating‖ their synthetic bets that
the subprime market would fail often repeatedly insured against the same weak subprime
tranches, i.e., many weak subprime tranches were ―bet‖ to fail multiple times.8 In essence,
therefore, once a borrower defaulted on a mortgage, the loss in the real economy was
exponentially multiplied by the many side bets placed on whether that borrower would default.
Mr. Paulson‘s investments are reflective of trillions of dollars bet on the subprime
market, and the astronomical amounts owed to the holders of this unregulated ―insurance‖ of the
subprime market serve as a microcosm of the worldwide financial crisis.9
Most importantly, the ―insurers‖ of the subprime market (some of the most prominent
financial institutions in the world) were not required to have capital to sustain their insurance or
to post collateral to ensure their payments. (Had these investments been governed by insurance
or gaming laws, those betting that subprime mortgages would be paid would have been required
to have adequate capital to ensure payments if the bet were lost.) And, when the ―insurers‖ were
―surprised‖ to find that those without creditworthiness could not pay their mortgages, they did
not have the ability to pay off their indebtedness to the holders of synthetic CDOs. However,
4

Id.
Svea Herbst-Bayliss and Kevin Lim, Paulson reassures on Goldman role, REUTERS (April 21, 2010), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/21/us-goldman-paulson-redemptionsidUSTRE63K0C620100421?pageNumber=1.
6
FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 195.
7
See THE BIG SHORT, supra note 1, at 51.
8
See id.
9
See generally THE BIG SHORT, supra note 1; see also INSIDE JOB, supra note 1.
5
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what should have been a zero-sum game was converted from a lose-lose game into a win-win
situation, i.e., the Mr. Paulsons of this world only got paid because ―insurers‖ were subsidized by
the taxpayer so that the ―casinos‖ could make payment on the bets. Unlike regular gambling, no
gambler lost – except the perfectly innocent bystanders: the U.S. taxpayer.10
As it now stands, the world is attempting to dig itself out of the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930‘s – a task now aggravated, inter alia, by the burden of
escalating energy and food commodity prices. As will be shown below, dozens of studies suggest
that even those escalating commodity prices may very well be aided by betting on the upward
direction of those prices through passive investments originated by U.S. financial institutions
using unregulated OTC derivatives.11
Dodd-Frank Provides the Tools to Protect the U.S. Taxpayer. As will be shown below,
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, thanks to the major contribution of this Committee, would
make it very difficult to repeat the kind of undercapitalized, non-transparent, and economybusting ―betting‖ mentioned above. That statute, if properly implemented, (1) requires all major
players to have adequate capital to enter the market to sustain their potentially huge obligations;
(2) requires that almost all of these kinds of investments be collateralized by counterparties; (3)
requires almost all of these investments to be guaranteed and properly margined by clearing
facilities, which, in turn, are subject to strict federal regulation and oversight; (4) requires all of
these transactions to be publicly recorded and, in many instances, traded on public exchanges or
exchange-like environments; and (5) collectively places the CFTC, the SEC, and the members of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council in a position to have full transparency of these kinds of
investments with an eye to preventing the kind of systemic risk that threatened the world
economy in the fall of 2008.
We Are Not Home Free Yet. As will be shown below, there is now a substantial question
whether Title VII of Dodd-Frank will be properly implemented because of resistance by big
banks and other financial institutions. According to the Comptroller of the Currency, five big
Wall Street banks have controlled 98% of the existing (pre-Dodd-Frank) OTC derivatives
market, thereby necessitating, for example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to
intervene in one of the critically important CFTC and SEC proposed rulemakings concerning
ownership of the major new financial institutions created by Dodd-Frank. The big banks want to
keep these institutions within their control. Needless to say, if properly implemented, the huge
profits of these and other banks will be diminished by the competition that a transparent market
brings, in the words of Dodd-Frank, ―free and open access‖ to what would be highly competitive
derivatives markets.
While each argument advanced by swaps dealers must be analyzed on its own merits,
there can be no mistake that a fundamental underlying tenet of minimizing the impact of DoddFrank, either implicitly or explicitly, is that we are now out of the financial crisis and there is no
need for change. Therefore, it is suggested that as much of the status quo ante as can be

10

See THE BIG SHORT, supra note at 1, at 256.
Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition, EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF COMMODITY SPECULATION BY
ACADEMICS, ANALYSTS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (2011),
http://www.nefiactioncenter.com/PDF/evidenceonimpactofcommodityspeculation.pdf.
11
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preserved should now be left in place. A subsidiary argument is that if Dodd-Frank is fully
enforced, it will be a job killer.
As shown above, the undercapitalized casino that unregulated derivatives fostered in the
subprime housing market was the ultimate job and pension killer. The misery created by that
unregulated market often gets lost in Wall Street talking points. Moreover, the economic
infrastructure built before Dodd-Frank around subprime mortgages exists, e.g., for prime
mortgages, commercial mortgages, student loans, auto and credit card debt.
We are presently in a jobless ―recovery.‖ Moreover, the shock of rapidly escalating
energy and food prices, as well as threatened defaults by municipalities and European Union
sovereign states, can either individually or collectively create economic dislocations akin to that
experienced in the fall of 2008. For example, there is almost certainly an untold number of
grossly undercapitalized naked CDS on municipal and sovereign obligations. If there are
widespread defaults in those areas, an untold number of ―insurance‖ guarantees will be triggered.
The loss of profits of ―too big to fail‖ financial institutions, which have fully recovered
and may be stronger now than before the meltdown, must be balanced against the well being of
the American consumer, worker and taxpayer. Rejecting Dodd-Frank on the assumption that all
is now well is a dangerous strategy to follow legislatively or at the regulatory level.
Whatever new costs Dodd-Frank imposes (and those costs are greatly exaggerated by
those seeking to deflate regulation) are minimal compared to the dire economic havoc that might
be caused by under-regulation, especially when Congress is now almost devoid of ―stimulus
bullets‖ to repair future economic ills.
Funding for the CFTC and SEC. Severely hampering the CFTC‘s and SEC‘s ability to
implement Title VII of Dodd-Frank are their challenging financial and staffing conditions. I
recognize that this Committee can only serve an authorization – not appropriation – role. It also
only has jurisdiction over the CFTC. Nevertheless, the voice of this Committee on funding by
appropriators for the CFTC can doubtless play an important role in ensuring proper
implementation of Dodd-Frank.
With regard to the CFTC, that agency‘s gross underfunding makes performing its new
and complex functions under Dodd-Frank ―a herculean task.‖12 Under the new regulations, the
CFTC must examine a voluminous amount of data and information encompassing transactions
that number in the millions.13 An $11 million slash in the technology budget has forced the
agency to cease developing a new program that would scan the overwhelming number of trades
to detect suspicious trading. Moreover, the potential long-term effects of insufficient funding is
severe; operating under its current budget will mean that applications, findings, and enforcement
required by the new law would languish.14 As Commissioner Bart Chilton aptly warns, ―Without
12

Ben Protess, Regulators Decry Proposed Cuts in C.F.T.C. Budget, N.Y. TIMES (February 24, 2011) (quoting
CFTC Commissioner Michael Dunn), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/regulators-decryproposed-c-f-t-c-budget-cuts/?ref=todayspaper.
13
Jean Eaglesham and Victoria McGrane, Budget Rift Hinders CFTC, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2011).
14
See Transcript of the Congressional Hearing to Review Implementation of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act before the H. Comm. on Agriculture (Feb. 15, 2011) (statement of
Terry Duffy, Executive Chairman, CEM Group).
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the funding, we could once again risk another calamitous disintegration.‖15 Lack of funds not
only shortchanges the Commission, but it also risks another widespread financial crisis.
In this regard, the CFTC lacks an adequate number of personnel to perform its increased
regulatory duties. From 1999 to 2007, the agency shrunk from 567 full-time equivalents
(―FTEs‖) to 437. By 2010, the number of FTEs had risen to 650, only a 30% increase in the
number of personnel since the agency‘s establishment in 1975. Chairman Gary Gensler
estimates that he needs an additional 400 people to meet the challenges of regulating the multitrillion dollar derivatives markets.16 As Barbara Roper of the Consumer Federation of America
has noted, for example, the ―draconian cuts‖ of the House of Representatives‘ proposed budget
would ―decimate that tiny agency without making any meaningful inroads in the federal
deficit.‖17 Even the relatively fiscally conservative Financial Times has within this last week
editorialized that the SEC and CFTC deserve the funding levels that were promised to prevent a
future meltdown through proper implementation of Dodd-Frank.
It is one thing to attack Dodd-Frank frontally by seeking deregulatory action either
through legislation or weakened rules. There can be little doubt, however, that starving financial
regulatory agencies dependent upon appropriations is a de facto rescission of Dodd-Frank. It asks
Americans to face yet another crisis under the guise of budget cuts – a crisis that may ―the next
time‖ drag the United States and the world into the next Great Depression.
In making this point, I also want to commend the CFTC for its heroic work in meeting
the necessarily rigorous deadlines imposed by Dodd-Frank for well over 60 new rules. I spent 25
years in a private law practice heavily devoted to rulemaking advocacy, and then involvement in
the judicial review of those rules in virtually every federal circuit court of appeals in the country
and in the United States Supreme Court. I was also very proud of the many rules that were
promulgated by the CFTC while I was the Director of the Division of Trading and Markets.
However, the hard and productive work performed by the CFTC in implementing Dodd-Frank,
especially with its small staff, is extraordinary. The quality of that work also meets the highest
standards of public service. This Committee should be very proud of this effort. The agency has
more than demonstrated that it will be a vigilant protector of the important markets it now
oversees if it receives the financial support it needs from this Congress.
This testimony will highlight the manner in which the lack of regulation of the OTC
derivatives market was a principal cause of the 2008 credit crisis and the resulting onset of the
Great Recession and how Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, if properly implemented, can avoid
similar crises in the future. The remainder of this testimony is based principally on my soon to
be published article in the University of Maryland School of Law‘s Journal of Business and
15

See Statement of Bart Chilton, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Risky Business
(February 24, 2011), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement022411.html.
16
Ben Protess and Mac William Bishop, At Center of Derivatives Debate, a Gung-Ho Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/at-center-of-debate-over-derivatives-a-gung-horegulator/.
17
See Statement of Barbara Roper, Director of Investment Protection, Consumer Federation of America, Feb. 14,
2011.
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Technology Law, as well as on a series of my previously published articles and testimony
delivered to Congress and to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.18
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000’s Deregulation of Swaps
On December 15, 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (―CFMA‖), which President Clinton signed into law on December 21, 2000.19 The CFMA
removed OTC derivatives transactions, including energy futures transactions, from all
requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the CEA so long as the counterparties to the
swap were ―eligible contract participants.‖20 Generally speaking, a counterparty to be an
―eligible contract participant‖ had to have in excess of $10 million in total assets with some
limited exceptions allowing lesser amounts in the case of an individual using the swap for risk
management purposes.21
Thus, the OTC derivatives market (at that time according to then-Treasury Secretary
Summers amounting to $80 trillion notional value) was exempt from the traditional and timetested regulatory controls of the securities and futures markets: capital adequacy requirements;
reporting and disclosure; regulation of intermediaries; self regulation; any bars on fraud,
manipulation22 and excessive speculation; and requirements for clearing. The SEC was similarly

18

This testimony article draws significantly from Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative
Sunlight: Dodd-Frank‘s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by An Unregulated Multi-Trillion
Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 127 (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/41/, as well as the following previous publications and written
testimony: Derivatives in the Crisis and Financial Reform, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL CRISES,
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS HANDBOOK (Gerald Epstein & Martin Wolfson eds., forthcoming 2011); Is Our
Economy Safe? A Proposal for Assessing the Success of Swaps Regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act, in THE
FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REFORM: WILL IT WORK? HOW WILL WE KNOW? (Roosevelt Institute 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/34; Out of the Black Hole: Regulatory Reform of the Over-theCounter Derivatives Market, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 99 (Roosevelt Institute 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/35/; Out of the Black Hole: Reining in the Reckless Market in Overthe-Counter Derivatives, AMERICAN PROSPECT (2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/37; and Written Testimony of Michael Greenberger, Hearing Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Regarding The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis (June 30, 2010),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf [hereinafter FCIC Testimony].
19
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
20
See FCIC Testimony, supra note 18, at 9.
21
PHILLIP MC BRIDE JOHNSON AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION §1.02[3] 328-29 (Aspen 2004)
[hereinafter DERIVATIVES REGULATION].
22
Unlike financial swaps, which were ―excluded‖ from the exchange trading requirement, including fraud and
manipulation prohibitions, energy and metals swaps, while relieved of the exchange trading, continued to be subject
to fraud and manipulation prohibitions; they were therefore labeled by the CFMA as ―exempt‖ transactions. Id.
Compare § 2(g) (relating to financial swaps) with § 2(h) relating to energy and metals swaps. Id. See also CHARLES
W. EDWARDS ET. AL., COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION 28 (2001)
(quoting remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, 146 Cong. Rec. S11896, December 15, 2000, ―The Act continues the CFTC‘s
antifraud and anti-manipulation authority with regard to exempt transaction in energy and metals derivative
markets.‖). By exempting metals and energy swaps from exchange trading, Congress disagreed with the unanimous
recommendation of the President‘s Working Group that swaps concerning ―finite‖ supplies not be removed from the
exchange trading mandate of the CEA. Id.
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barred from OTC derivatives oversight except for the limited fraud jurisdiction it maintained
over securities-based swaps.23
Recognizing that the deregulation of swaps would encourage widespread speculation
through derivatives trading, the CFMA also expressly preempted state gaming and anti-bucket
shop laws,24 which would have barred the otherwise unregulated betting authorized by the
CFMA.25
Years later, during the Troubled Asset Relief Program (―TARP‖) hearings in September
2008, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox warned Congress about the need for ―immediate
legislative action,‖ because he viewed the OTC credit derivatives market as a ―regulatory
blackhole‖ based on the deregulatory provisions adopted within the CFMA.26
To address the problems presented by the unregulated OTC derivatives market, on July
21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (―Dodd-Frank‖)27 into law. If properly implemented, the statute establishes a comprehensive
regulatory framework to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity.
Specifically, Dodd-Frank:
provides for the registration and comprehensive regulation (including capital
requirements and business conduct rules) of swap dealers and major swap participants;
imposes collateral and trade execution requirements for most derivative products;
imposes margin and capital requirements for all cleared swaps;
creates recordkeeping and real-time reporting requirements; and
enhances regulators‘ ability to observe these markets, thereby enhancing enforcement
activities for fraud and manipulation and assisting in preventing systemically risky
practices.
The Economic Meltdown as a Failure of OTC Derivatives Regulation
Although many factors contributed to the financial meltdown of 2008, principal among
them was the collapse of the market in OTC derivatives. The OTC market in naked credit
default swaps and synthetic collateralized debt obligations provided the trigger that launched the
mortgage crisis, credit crisis, and systemic financial crisis that threatened to implode the global

23

See FCIC Testimony, supra note 18, at 10.
See DERIVATIVES REGULATION at 975, supra note 21.
25
Id.
26
Robert O‘Harrow, Jr. and Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at A1(quoting
former Chairman Christopher Cox, ―The regulatory blackhole for credit-default swaps is one of the most significant
issues we are confronting in the current credit crisis … and it requires immediate legislative action.‖).
27
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203.
24
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financial system, were it not for a multi-trillion dollar U.S. taxpayer intervention.28 At the time of
the crisis, this OTC market was estimated to have a notional value of $596 trillion, including
approximately $58 trillion in CDSs,29 yet federal regulators (and most state regulators) were
barred by a federal statute from ensuring stability in these transactions.30 Before explaining
below the manner in which naked credit default swaps (sometimes referred to as synthetic
collaterized debt obligations) fomented this crisis, it is worth citing in the margin those many
economists,31 regulators,32 market observers,33 and financial columnists34 who have described the
central role unregulated CDS and synthetic CDOs played in the crisis.35

28

See generally Vikas Bajaj, Surprises in a Closer Look at Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B0;
Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A0; Jon Hilsenrath
et al., Worst Crisis Since ‗30s, With no End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1; Testimony of Dr. Alan
Greenspan, The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://clipsandcomment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/greenspan-testimony-20081023.pdf.
29
Naohiko Babo and Paola Gallardo, OTC Market Activity in the Second Half of 2007, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS (May 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0805.pdf.
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CDSs were the last step in a subprime securitization process that came to undermine the
economy.36 A counterparty investing in a CDS paid, at most, about a 2% ―premium‖ to another
counterparty for the latter to agree to ―guarantee‖ that the weakest parts of a financial instrument,
a collateralized debt obligation (―CDO‖), would not fail.37 Thus, a CDS can be seen as a form of
insurance on the success of specified tranches of a CDO.38 CDOs, in turn, involved the ―pulling
together and dissection into ‗tranches‘ of huge numbers of [mortgage-backed securities

33
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(‗MBSs‘)],‖ based for their part on mortgage loans and, in the years before the crisis, subprime
mortgages in particular.39
Importantly, by ―reframing the form of risk (e.g., from subprime mortgages to MBSs to
CDOs),‖ those investors providing the guarantees of or insurance for the subprime market
through CDSs lost sight of the fundamental transaction at issue, i.e., whether noncreditworthy
borrowers would pay home loans, and, because of the confusion caused by the reframing of risk,
mistakenly thought that their investments were safe.40 This problem was compounded by
―misleadingly high evaluations‖ by credit rating agencies of those self-evidently weak tranches.41
In addition, issuers of CDSs relied upon the faulty assumption that housing prices would never
go down, so that they would never have to pay the guarantees they were providing.42
Because CDSs were widely understood to be risk-free, financial institutions began
writing ―naked‖ CDSs to investors who had no direct investment in or risk from CDOs or
MBSs.43 That is, investors bet with relatively small insurance-type premiums that certain
handpicked mortgage-based instruments would fail, and that they would receive a hefty payment
if they did.44 Estimates suggest that before the crisis, there were almost certainly multiples of
―naked‖ CDS to those based on insuring actual risk.45
All of this came to a head when housing prices began to plummet.46 Homeowners began
to default on loans, leading to the failure of CDOs and triggering obligations of CDS issuers.47
Synthetic CDOs and naked CDSs added exponentially to the obligations owed, i.e., the economy
was not only confronted with real economic losses from the actual defaults, but from the
multiplier effect of the betting losses on the wagers of whether those loans would be paid. 48
This problem was especially insidious, because those who sold the guarantees believed
that these provisions would never be triggered, issuers had not set aside sufficient capital to pay
them off and therefore could not honor their contractual commitments.49 In addition, because the
investments were not reported to regulators, both the government and the financial community
were surprised by the size of the market upon widespread defaults, which led to uncertainty and
a tightening of credit.50 Because the ―bets‖ were private and unreported transactions, in a panic
with failures of household financial institutions, the assumption was that all such institutions had
or would have betting liabilities. All of these actual losses and fears of further losses resulted in
the downward cycle of the economic meltdown, exacerbated by the fact that CDOs and CDSs
existed not just in the subprime mortgage market, but in most credit markets.51
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The analysis surrounding this subject estimates that there may have been three to four
times as many ―naked‖ CDS instruments extant at the time of the meltdown than CDSs
guaranteeing actual risk.52 This means that to the extent the guarantor of a CDS (e.g., AIG) had
to be rescued by the U.S. taxpayer, the chances were very high that the ―bail out‖ was of failed
naked CDS bets that mortgages would be paid.53 (Prominent members of Congress have
maintained that the holders of bets that mortgages would fail have formed a strong political
constituency against the ―rescue‖ of subprime borrowers through the adjustment of mortgages to
keep homeowners from defaulting).54
The fact that ―naked‖ CDS and ―synthetic‖ CDOs were nothing more than ―bets‖ on the
viability of the subprime market also demonstrates the importance of the CFMA expressly
preempting state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws.55 Had those laws not been preempted, it is
almost certain that at least some states would have banned these investments as unlicensed
gambling or illegal bucket shops.56 An action of this sort by even a single state would have
made the ―naked‖ CDS market economically unviable throughout the country.57
Moreover, doubtless because Eric Dinallo, in his then capacity as New York Insurance
Superintendent, seriously considered regulating CDS as insurance58 and because the National
Council of Insurance Legislators were working on a model code to regulate CDS as insurance,59
Wall Street lobbyists ensured that the Dodd-Frank Act would also preempt state insurance law as
it applies to swaps that are neither cleared or exchange traded.60
Dodd-Frank’s Solutions for Regulating Swaps
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (―Dodd-Frank Act‖) into law.61 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
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Corporate Funding Costs, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk.
53
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of Senate Democrats‘ opposition to cram down).
55
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transforms the regulation of OTC derivatives by generally requiring that swaps be subject to
clearing and exchange-like trading, including capital and margin requirements.62
The Act first requires that all ―swap dealers‖ and ―major swap participants‖ register with
the appropriate banking regulators, the CFTC, and/or the SEC.63 A swap dealer is an entity that
(1) holds itself out as such, (2) makes a market in swaps, (3) regularly enters into swaps for its
own account in the ordinary course of business, or (4) engages in activity generally recognized in
the trade as dealing in swaps.64 Major swap participants are entities that are not swap dealers and
(1) maintain a substantial position in swaps, excluding transactions used to hedge commercial
risk, (2) create substantial counterparty exposure that could undermine the banking system or
financial markets, or (3) are highly leveraged, not subject to capital requirements, and maintain a
substantial position in swaps.65
Registered swap dealers and major swap participants must disclose any material risks of
swaps and any material incentives or conflicts of interests.66 In addition, they must meet capital
and margin requirements and conform to business conduct rules, including those related to fraud
and market manipulation, that are set by the regulators (while clearing organizations and
exchanges can supplement these requirements).67 They must also conform to position limits on
their trading volume in commodity swaps, which are to be set by the regulators.68 The DoddFrank Act also requires that swaps transactions be reported.69
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes the clearing and exchange-like trading requirements on most
swap transactions.70 Both types of regulation are central features of the CEA‘s regulation of
futures.71 Under a clearing system, a clearing facility stands between the buyer and seller of a
contract to guarantee each against failure of the other party.72 To avoid their own liability,
clearing facilities have a strong incentive to establish and enforce the capital adequacy of traders,
including the collection of margin, i.e., deposits on the amount at risk in a trade.73 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory agencies decide whether specific types of swaps must be cleared,
and designated clearing organizations (―DCOs‖) must inform regulators about which types of
swaps they plan to clear.74 DCOs must allow ―non-discriminatory‖ access to clearing.75 Swaps
62

BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AND THE 111TH
CONGRESS 12 (2010) available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40975_20100601.pdf (―H.R. 4173 . . . mandate[s]
reporting, centralized clearing, and exchange-trading of OTC derivatives . . . The bill[] require[s] regulators to
impose capital requirements on swap dealers and ‗major swap participants.‘‖).
63
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731(a) (2010).
64
Id. § 721(a).
65
Id.
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Id. §§ 737, 763(h).
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Id. § 727(c).
70
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that are required to be cleared must also be traded on a designated contract market, securities
exchange or swap execution facility (―SEF‖).76 Swaps do not have to be cleared or exchange
traded if no existing entity lists a particular swap product.77
The Dodd-Frank Act contains an ―end-user‖ exception to clearing designed to ease the
burden on businesses using swaps to mitigate risk associated with their commercial activities.78
For example, airlines buying fuel may use uncleared swaps to hedge against price increases. The
exception applies to parties that are not financial entities, are using swaps to hedge or mitigate
commercial risk, and have notified the CFTC and/or SEC as to how they meet financial
obligations of non-cleared swaps.79 It does not cover swaps in which both parties are major
swap participants, swap dealers, or other financial entities.80
Despite the end-user exception, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes its reporting requirements
for all swaps, whether or not they are cleared.81 The swaps must be reported to a registered swap
data repository, the CFTC or the SEC, and reporting must occur as soon as technologically
possible after execution.82 The Act‘s sponsors and the regulators have now stated that margin
requirements are not intended to apply to end-users.83
An important provision in the Dodd-Frank Act is the Lincoln or ―Push-Out‖ Rule, which
prohibits federal assistance to any bank operating as a swap dealer in most commodity-type
derivatives transactions.84 Federal assistance is defined broadly to include, inter alia, federal
deposit insurance or access to the Federal Reserve‘s discount window.85 Although the Push-Out
Rule does not take effect for two years, its logical consequence may be to encourage banks to
―push out‖ or divest their commodity-based swap divisions, so that they can maintain access to
federal banking resources.86
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Similarly, the Volcker Rule generally prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading
(that is, trading that is on its own behalf and not a customer‘s) or acquiring or retaining an
interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.87 While the Volcker Rule will not be
implemented immediately,88 the consequence almost certainly is that many of these activities
will also move from banks to other smaller and less systemically risky entities.89
Dodd-Frank also creates a resolution authority, which allows complicated questions of the
orderly unwinding of a too-big-to-fail institution to be handled administratively rather than in a
bankruptcy proceeding.90 However, as one noted economist has recently made clear, the
unwinding of the obligations of OTC counterparties may, in the absence of effective
implementation of the Dodd-Frank OTC derivative reforms, be far too complex regardless of
whether it is conducted by banking regulators or by a court.91 Robert Johnson has concluded:
[W]hen a [too big to fail institution] is in trouble — and there are substantial
holdings of complex and opaque derivatives on the balance sheets of all [such]
firms — resolution authorities have difficulty unraveling web of exposures and
valuing them properly. . . .Unfortunately, it is easy to understand why resolution
authorities could be induced to forebear rather than resolve [an too big to fail
institution] when they have no clarity about its structure and patterns of
exposures. In such a circumstance, it may be easier to incur the risk that the
insolvent [firm‘s] balance sheet should continue to deteriorate. . . .92
How Will We Know If the Dodd-Frank Act Is Working?
Dodd-Frank has been hailed as an important and comprehensive financial reform.93 But
like many reforms before it, proof of its success lies not within the text of the law, but in how it
is administratively implemented. Those questions of implementation are now hotly contested in
SEC and CFTC rulemakings. In thinking about how those rulemakings will be carried out, it is
worth asking, for example, what will that previously destabilizing market look like in five years?
How will we know if the Act has successfully changed the landscape of the U.S. financial
system? How will we know if taxpayers and consumers are better protected against another
economic meltdown? If effectively implemented, OTC markets should ultimately have:
1. Ninety per cent of standardized OTC derivatives being cleared and exchange traded,
with just 10% exempt based on the end-user exclusion.
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Id. § 619.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council will first conduct a six-month study, after which regulators will have
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91
See Johnson, supra note 34, at 123.
92
Id.
93
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The basic rule of the Dodd-Frank Act is that swaps must be cleared and exchange traded.
One of the few exceptions is for commercial end users.94 As CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has
said, the ―exception should be . . . defined to include only nonfinancial entities that use swaps as
an incidental part of their business to hedge actual commercial risks. Even though individual
transactions with a financial counterparty may seem insignificant, in aggregate, they can affect
the health of the entire system.‖95
To achieve this end, regulators must carefully consider how they define hedging for
commercial risk. A model for doing so may come from proposed CFTC position limit
regulations promulgated in January 2010, which would have imposed potential speculative
position limits on futures contracts for certain energy commodities.96 Suggesting an exemption
for bona fide hedging, the CFTC relied on a definition from regulation 1.3(z), under which bona
fide hedging includes ―transactions or positions [that] normally represent a substitute for
transactions to be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel,
and where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise.‖97 Further, the CFTC emphasized that ―[u]nder the
proposed regulations, traders holding positions pursuant to a bona fide hedge exemption would
generally be prohibited from also trading speculatively. This definition limits the end-user
exemption to those whose intent is, ultimately, to purchase or sell a physical commodity, rather
than a bank.‖98 Such an approach would be sufficiently narrow to limit financial entities from
circumventing the central Dodd-Frank regulatory tenets: clearing and exchange-like trading.
2. Swap dealers or major swap participants will have no more than 20% ownership of
any derivative clearing organization (―DCO‖), board of trade (―BOT‖), or swap execution
facility (―SEF‖).
One of the main principals shaping derivatives regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act is to
provide free and open access to clearing and exchange trading by financial institutions.99 Simply
put, clearing and exchange trading are designed to reduce risk by providing price transparency,
requiring that investors set aside adequate capital in case of default, and producing public
94
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information on who is involved in trading and to what extent.100 But if large numbers of trading
institutions are excluded from clearing organizations or exchanges, the protections otherwise
contributed by these requirements will be undermined.101
Already, large swap dealers and banks are working by lobbying and through the proposed
rulemaking process to limit access by and competition from smaller entities by creating ways to
exert large bank control over DCOs, BOTs, and SEFs.102 According to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, just five U.S. banks represent 98% of the total amount invested by
banks in swaps.103 In many cases, clearinghouses and exchanges are dominated by very large
financial institutions, including those that are the five dominant swaps dealers.104 In an apparent
attempt to discourage competition, the big banks, in their roles as clearinghouse owners, have
imposed unnecessarily high capital requirements or other thresholds, far in excess of that needed
for conservative risk management, as minimums for satisfying the clearinghouse membership
eligibility, in order to keep smaller but highly credit worthy institutions out of the clearing
process.105
While several proposals have been advanced, a simple solution to this problem is to
curtail the influence and control of large banks over clearing and exchange institutions by
capping their ownership at a maximum of 20%. Indeed, the CFTC proposed a rule that included
imposing the 20% ownership limitations on October 1, 2010.106 The 20% ownership restriction
is similar to an amendment proposed in 2009 by Representative Stephen Lynch and included in
the House version of the Dodd-Frank bill. This amendment would have restricted the beneficial
ownership interest to an aggregate of 20% of all swap dealers and major swap participants, as
well as those associated with them.107 Although the Lynch amendment was removed from
Dodd-Frank by the Conference Committee before final passage, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the
CFTC and SEC to adopt rules eliminating conflicts of interest arising from the control of
clearing and exchange institutions where a swap dealer or major swap participant has ―a material
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debt or material equity investment.‖108 In carrying out the duties expressly delegated by the Act,
the CFTC and SEC have complete and unfettered discretion to create restrictions on
ownership—including aggregate numerical caps.109 These restrictions would be effective and
clear tools for ensuring that large banks would not employ highly anti-competitive policies over
clearing and exchange institutions in a manner that would exclude smaller, but fully capitalized,
participants.
Some observers have argued that requiring an independent board of governors—that is,
one that is not comprised of banks, but outside experts or other members—would effectively
avoid the problem of overly concentrated power.110 However, a recent example shows the
futility of relying on that approach alone: In 2009, ICE Trust acquired the Clearing Corp.,
creating a clearinghouse essentially owned by nine of the largest swap trading banks.111
Although ICE Trust claims to be managed by an independent board, the acquisition involved a
profit-sharing scheme in which these banks not only have an ownership in ICE Trust, but, in
addition, will receive collectively in their own names 50% of the profits. The founding banks
will be subject to a pricing structure distinct from that applied to other banks.112 In order to
mitigate the potential conflicts of interest in the operation of a DCO, DCM, and SEF, the CFTC
and the SEC separately proposed rules to mandate more outside directors to serve on the board of
a DCO, DCM and SEF.113 However, when confronting the kind of massive concentration of
108
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market power through the ownership of the strongest swaps dealers as is presently the case with
ICE Trust, even the most demanding requirements for the inclusion of independent board
directors, in and of themselves, can by no means realistically insure Dodd-Frank‘s ―free and
open access‖ mandate. There must be strict aggregate ownership limits to complement strong
independent director requirements.
3. All large financial institutions that deal in or buy swaps would be subject to strict
capital requirements and rigorous business conduct rules.
As noted above, swap dealers and major swap participants must conform to capital
requirements and business conduct rules set by the regulators. As they define the term ―swap
dealers,‖ regulators should aim to capture the top 200 or so entities dealing in derivatives.114 As
Chairman Gensler recently stated, ―initial estimates are that there could be in excess of 200
entities that will seek to register as swap dealers [under the Dodd-Frank Act],‖ including ―[209]
global and regional banks currently known to offer swaps‖ as ―Primary Members‖ of the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (―ISDA‖).115 These entities should be
encompassed by the definitions adopted by the CFTC and SEC.
To achieve this number, these agencies should consider how they define several terms.
First, the CFTC and SEC should adopt a definition used by ISDA for deciding which institutions
should be registered. The ISDA definition includes all business organizations and entities that
deal in derivatives except those who do so ―solely for the purposes of risk hedging or asset or
liability management.‖116 In adopting this definition, the regulators should also clarify that it
does not exclude entities that claim to use derivatives for risk hedging or asset or liability
management, but for whom the transactions could materially affect their financial condition
based on the significant revenue generated by the swaps.
Another key issue will be how to determine whether a firm enters into swaps in the
course of ―regular business,‖ because swap dealers do not include persons who enter into swaps
for their own account, as long as they do not do so as part of their regular business.117 To ensure
that regulation will cover the largest dealers, regulators should define regular business based on
an institution‘s annual average trading revenue from all swaps activities, as a percentage of total
trading revenue. This percentage provides insight as to the nature of an institution‘s business,
and agencies should use it to compare the relative positions of various institutions as well as the
importance of swaps to a particular firm.118
Because trading revenue from swaps activities is currently unavailable to the public or
regulators,119 in order to allow regulators to assess this percentage, the regulators should require
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all entities that have annual trading revenue over one billion dollars to provide the appropriate
regulator with audited financial statements reporting gross and net trading revenue from all swap
activities. The percentage triggering regulation should be two percent, and the percentage should
be adjusted accordingly based on the reported data going forward.
The term ―major swap participant‖ encompasses three broad categories: entities that
maintain a substantial position in ―major swaps categories,‖ those that pose substantial risk to
counterparties, and those that are highly leveraged.120
Here, ―major swaps categories‖ should be broken down to reflect relatively specific
commodity products, so that entities that are heavily involved in a commodity—and thus can
influence prices—do not escape regulation by ―hiding‖ within a larger category. For example,
the categories should be defined not just as ―energy‖ or even ―crude oil,‖ but should be broken
down to a precise commodity product, i.e., ―light sweet crude oil.‖ In addition, ―substantial
position‖ should be measured by the notional value of an entity‘s swap positions, as a proportion
of the notional value of all swaps positions held by all entities. This illustrates how concentrated
risk is, and regulators can use the information to ensure that the firms with the most risk are
covered by regulation.
Entities creating substantial counterparty exposure can be determined by looking at two
factors: (1) how much is currently at risk in case of default, measured by the market value of
contracts, and (2) how much could potentially be at risk in the future over the life of the
contract.121 To assess both, agencies should consider how many counterparties are at risk
through swaps transactions with a given entity—a measure of interconnectedness, or the extent
to which an institution‘s failure would have a ripple effect into the overall economy. In addition,
agencies should consider the financial stability of counterparties to capture transactions that
involve one or very few counterparties but may still create substantial risk.
Highly leveraged entities can be identified based on the entities‘ current credit risk
relative to their capital.122 Where agencies find that entities have taken on too much risk, they
should restrict them from additional swaps activities and/or require an increase in available
capital. This will prevent an excessively leveraged firm from triggering significant market
dysfunction.123
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4. Proprietary and commodity trading, hedge and equity funds, and uncleared credit
default swaps will be generally moved from large banks to smaller structures with fewer
potential adverse impacts on the overall financial system.
As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act includes both the ―Volcker Rule,‖ which generally
prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading or ownership of hedge or equity funds, and
the ―Lincoln‖ or ―Push-Out Rule,‖ which requires bank holding companies to establish separate
affiliated corporations for, inter alia, most commodity swaps dealings and unregulated CDSs in
order to benefit from federal assistance.124 Although both provisions have long lead times before
implementation, they are already having their intended effects.125
In anticipation of the Volcker Rule, for example, a private equity division at Bank of
America left in the fall of 2010 to form a new hedge fund.126 Even before the final bill was
passed, Citigroup sold a private equity fund, and it is considering moving at least one of its
proprietary trading units into a separate hedge fund.127 At Goldman Sachs, proprietary traders
are reportedly leaving to join new or existing hedge funds.128 Moreover, Bloomberg reported
that ―Goldman Sachs during 2010 ‗liquidated substantially all of the positions‘ in the principalstrategies unit that operated within the firm‘s equities division.‖129 JP Morgan recently
announced it will shut down its proprietary trading in commodities as a first step in closing down
all proprietary trading.130 All of these firms, and traders within them, have stated that they are
taking action to resolve regulatory uncertainty, so that they are not ―. . .worrying about what
they‘re going to be doing a couple of years from now. . . .‖131
As Kansas City Federal Reserve President Hoening has recently made clear, this
movement is healthy132—a sign that the Volcker and Lincoln Rules will have a powerful impact.
The transactions covered by the Rule will move from banks that are too-big-to-fail to more
diverse and less systemically risky parts of the market. As the Senate Committee on Banking
suggested, the Volcker Rule ―. . . will reduce the scale, complexity, and interconnectedness of
124
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those banks that are now actively engaged in proprietary trading, or have hedge fund or private
equity exposure. [It] will reduce the possibility that banks will be too big or too complex to
resolve in an orderly manner should they fail.‖133 In addition, investment banks will not be able
to create risky financial products and sell them to investors, while holding on to the other side of
the bets to make profits at customers‘ expense.134
The Lincoln or Push-Out Rule is also already driving risky trades into more diverse
structures.135 JP Morgan, for example, is spinning off its high-risk commodity derivatives into a
unit that will be separate from its other investments.136 This movement is healthy, because
speculation in commodity swaps has almost certainly contributed significantly to price volatility
in commodities and commodity index funds, an effect that has increased with the influx of more
speculation, including ―the rapid growth of index investment‖ in commodity futures markets.137
To the extent that smaller and more diverse entities engage in such speculation, they will have a
lessened impact on commodity index fund prices, simply because they have less influence in
these markets.138 Moreover, where commodity index funds for passive investors do have swaps
subject to Dodd-Frank, they will be subject to clearing and exchange-like trading.139
5. Energy and food prices will be explained by market fundamentals rather than factors
that may be attributable to excessive speculation.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC to set aggregate position limits on the amount of
swaps trading that entities can conduct140 with the goal of limiting excessive speculation and
subsequent volatility in commodities.141 Too much speculation can unmoor prices from market
fundamentals such as supply and demand.142 In essence, prices are usually determined by a
healthy tension between commercial users, who want low prices, and producers, who want high
ones. Speculators, however, are unconcerned about what a fair price for a commodity might be,
but rather they want prices to move dramatically in the direction of their bets.143 Since the
passage of the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936, as reinforced by Dodd-Frank, position limits,
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when properly enforced, minimize the role of speculation by limiting both its volume and
impact, allowing market fundamentals to be the primary driver of prices.144
The impact of weak position limits and excessive speculation on oil pricing was evident
between 2007 and 2009, when prices rose from $65 per barrel in June 2007, to $145 in July
2008, to the $30s in winter 2008-09, shifting to the $60s and $70s in 2009 and now back up to
$100. 145
There can be little doubt that the American consumer‘s pocketbooks will take a serious
beating because of destabilizing price spikes in traditional physical commodities, such as oil,
gasoline, heating oil and basic food staples. 146 As one prime example, we have seen a spike in
crude oil prices during the last six months: with no underlying change in supply and demand, the
price of crude oscillated from $73 per barrel in September 2010 to $99 in February 2011, an
increase of over 35 percent.147 According to International Energy Agency‘s Oil Market Report,
during the third and fourth quarters of 2011, the world oil demand increased by 0.2 mb/d.148
Notably, the world oil supply increased by 0.7 mb/d.149
Furthermore, while it is true much has been said about political destabilization within oil
producing countries having caused market ―fears‖ of oil shortages, the recent surge in the oil
price still seems to defy market fundamentals because Saudi Arabia, the largest world oil
supplier, has offered to ―make up for supplies lost because of unrest in Lybia.‖150 The
International Energy Agency said ―it will release emergency stockpiles, if needed.‖151 Most
economists and market watchers acknowledge that there is not now a supply/demand problem,
and that the present oil price volatility caused by ―adverse‖ expectations should be short term as
supply stability becomes clear. However, they acknowledge that permanent crude oil price spikes
cannot be fully explained by either market realities or fears, but by excessive speculation. The
144
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Dodd-Frank position limit mandate is designed to combat the adverse impact of too much or
―excessive‖ speculation.
In addition to the recent oil price spike, the 2007-2008 worldwide food crisis is resurgent.
Recently, the United Nation‘s Food and Agriculture Organization‘s economist Abdolreza
Abbassian has stated: ―In terms of price levels internationally I think the situation is certainly
getting closer to the levels that we had seen [in 2007-2008].‖152 He further added that increasing
food price volatility was, as a general matter, alarming and could threaten future food
security.153 Furthermore, the U.S. food staples prices are rising faster than overall inflation.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ―the consumer price index for all items minus
food and energy rose 0.8% over the year to September [2010], the lowest 12-month increase
since March 1961. […] The food index rose 1.4%, however.‖154 Spikes in food prices have
dramatically increased since September. The rise in commodity prices almost certainly cannot be
entirely explained by supply and demand. In fact, one market participant recently stated: ―We are
on the verge of another commodity bull run […] Wealthy clients are looking to buy commodity
futures, physical commodities, exchange-traded funds and equities with commodity
exposure.‖155 Notably, he also stated: ―Some investors, however, are troubled about the prospect
of contributing to another food price spike as seen in 2007/08 or about the sustainability of using
food stocks as biofuels, raising questions about the ethics of agriculture investing.‖156
As noted in footnote 11 above, the Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition has just
released a listing of dozens of analyses demonstrating that excessive speculation by passive
investors betting on price direction in commodity staples through derivatives causes unnecessary
volatility in commodity prices. On July 24, 2009, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations released a bipartisan 247-page staff report demonstrating conclusively that the
commodity bubble in red wheat from 2004 to 2008 can be attributed to excessive derivatives
speculation, as is true of the entire commodity bubble experienced during that period.157 On
January 13, 2011, the CFTC released by a 4-1 vote a proposed position limits rule that many
consumer advocates will likely find to be a far too weak implementation of the position limit
requirements of section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Two of the four Commissioners voting for
the proposed rule indicated that they would likely oppose that rule if it is returned in similar form
as a final rule by the CFTC staff. Comments are due on that proposed rule by March 28, 2011.
Hopefully, the CFTC will be persuaded by those commenters calling for greater controls of
passive speculators. However, many now fear that even a weak rule implementing Dodd-Frank
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position limit requirements will not see the light of day, because it will not get the support of
three CFTC commissioners.
If the price spike in commodity staples continues to increase, many respected economists
believe it will break the back of the financial recovery and likely send the economy into a
―double dip‖ recession. The merits of this debate cannot be resolved in this hearing, but this
Committee should certainly devote substantial oversight to the causative factors of the present
inflationary prices in food and energy and towards ensuring that Dodd-Frank‘s position limit
requirements are properly implemented at the regulatory level.
6. Even swaps that do not clear or exchange trade will be subject to real-time reporting
requirements.
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act affords the CFTC and SEC the authority to require
that uncleared swaps adhere to ―real-time reporting.‖ In particular, those swaps that are not
accepted for clearing must be reported to a registered swap data repository or, if no swap data
repository will accept the report, to regulators in a manner that does not disclose the business
transactions and market positions of any person.158 The Act defines ―real-time reporting‖ as
public dissemination of data relating to a transaction, including price and volume, as soon as
technologically practicable after the time at which the swap transaction has been executed.159
Also, the Act authorizes the CFTC and SEC to make swap transaction and pricing data
available to the public in such forms and at such times as are deemed appropriate to enhance
price discovery.160 In light of this, Chairman Gensler has recently stated:
[The CFTC] anticipate[s] rules in [the data reporting] area to require swap data
repositories to perform their core function of collecting and maintaining swaps
data and making it directly and electronically available to regulators. . . . It will be
important that swaps data be collected not only when the transaction occurs, but
also for each lifecycle event and valuation over its duration.161
Under these reporting requirements, regulators will receive all relevant and necessary
data in a timely manner.162 As such, the reporting requirements are significant because they are
one of the only ways that regulators and other observers can assess whether derivatives pose a
significant risk to the market through their size or the interconnectedness of counterparties.163
Indeed, the lack of reporting and transparency was a main cause of the Federal Reserve‘s, the
Treasury‘s, and all other prudential and market regulators‘ inability to anticipate the effect of
undercapitalized swaps on the worldwide economy in late 2007, 2008 and early 2009.164 Had the
mounting synthetic CDO bets been apparent to federal regulators, they doubtless would have
intervened with corrective actions much sooner.
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The issue of whether there will be meaningful ―real time reporting‖ as Dodd-Frank
contemplates or reporting of information that is too far out of date is now being hotly debated
before the regulatory agencies in the proposed rulemakings. The regulatory result here bears
careful watching by this Committee.
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